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I.  After the End of the Enlightenment   
Near the beginning of his History of Frederick the Great, Thomas Carlyle shifts 
his focus from the infant Frederick – who “lies in his cradle back in Berlin, sleeping most 
of the time” and is thus an unrewarding object for the narrator’s gaze – and turns to 
Hanover where a “rather disappointing” avenue stretches from the “Town Palace to the 
country one.” Looking down it we catch a glimpse of “a rather weak but hugely 
ingenious old gentleman, with bright eyes and long nose, with vast black peruke and 
bandy legs,” who happens to be making his way down the road.  The man is Leibniz and 
he is on his way to provide a diversion for the Electress Sophie by discussing 
philosophical matters with her. Carlyle admits that theirs will not be a “very edifying 
dialogue,” yet it is “the best that can be had in present circumstances.”  For Hanover is 
but the “lunar reflex of Versailles,” and whatever light falls on this court is of French 
origin.  Carlyle urges his reader not to think ill of the mix of “Eclecticism, Scepticism, 
Tolerance, Theodicea, and Bayle” that Hanover imported from Versailles: “Let us admit 
that it was profitable, at least that it was inevitable; let us pity it, and be thankful for it, 
and rejoice that we are well out of it” (Carlyle, 1858, I:34-35) 
Carlyle’s account of Frederick’s life offers admirers of the Enlightenment the 
opportunity to spend some time with a man who loathed the eighteenth century.  There is 
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a guilty pleasure to be found savoring those passages when Carlyle lays his cards on the 
table: 
To me the Eighteenth Century has nothing grand in it, except that 
grand universal Suicide, named French Revolution, by which it 
terminated its otherwise most worthless existence with at least one 
worthy act; — setting fire to its old home and self; and going up in 
flames and volcanic explosions, in a truly memorable and 
important manner. A very fit termination, as I thankfully feel, for 
such a Century. Century spendthrift, fraudulent-bankrupt; gone at 
length utterly insolvent, without real money of performance in its 
pocket, and the shops declining to take hypocrisies and speciosities 
any farther: — what could the poor Century do, but at length 
admit, "Well, it is so. I am a swindler-century, and have long been, 
— having learned the trick of it from my father and grandfather; 
knowing hardly any trade but that in false bills, which I thought 
foolishly might last forever, and still bring at least beef and 
pudding to the favored of mankind. And behold it ends; and I am a 
detected swindler, and have nothing even to eat. What remains but 
that I blow my brains out, and do at length one true action?" Which 
the poor Century did; many thanks to it … (Carlyle, 1858, I:7-8). 
Faced with a rant like this, admirers of the eighteenth century can take a perverse 
pleasure in reflecting on the terrible burden that has been placed on later critics of the 
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Enlightenment:  nothing that they will ever write or could ever hope to write will be the 
equal to Carlyle in its inventiveness, its wit, or its brutality. 
The detachment that permeates the best of Carlyle’s attacks flowed from an 
unshakeable conviction that he was dealing with something that was over and finished. 
The “swindler-century” had taken gun in hand and blown its brains out:  end of story – 
and the dawning of an age in which stories about that story could be told.  We need only 
contrast Carlyle’s view of the French Revolution with Burke’s to appreciate the rhetorical 
advantages that this conviction conveyed.  At his best Burke can approach Carlyle in the 
force of his invective, but Carlyle’s History is permeated by a sardonic wit that is lacking 
in the Reflections. For Carlyle, the passions that drove the Revolution were a thing of the 
past:  they could be loathed, lamented, and ridiculed, they no longer needed to be feared. 
For Burke, writing in 1791, the end of the Revolution was not yet in sight.  The same was 
true for the mischief wrought by those sinister forces that, at least in Burke’s overheated 
imagination, lay behind the revolution.  Towards the end of his life, Burke offered some 
words of support to the Abbe Barruel’s campaign to warn the world about the conspiracy 
of philosophes, freemasons, and Illuminati who he held responsible for hatching the plot 
that had touched off the Revolution.  For Barruel, for Burke, and for the various 
polemicists who wrote for British anti-Jacobin newspapers, the conspiracy that had been 
mounted (to borrow some words from John Robison’s version of the story) against “all 
the religions and governments of Europe” was still active (Schmidt, 2003).  Carlyle was 
free from such phantoms:  dreadful though the eighteenth century might have been, we 
are now well free of its grip. 
  Schmidt 4 
There is, however, one thing absent in Carlyle’s polemic against the 
Enlightenment:  the term the Enlightenment.  He was endlessly inventive in the terms of 
abuse he hurled at the period we call “the Enlightenment.”  But the word itself isn’t there.  
In view of the brilliance of so much of his writing, the absence is scarcely notable.  Yet, it 
may offer us a starting point for thinking about what is involved in talking about the end 
– and the ends – of enlightenment.  Not having a word for something doesn’t, of course, 
mean that the thing that will eventually be designated by the term wasn’t there.  When we 
look at Carlyle and others, it is easy enough to see that what they were criticizing is 
something we would call “the Enlightenment.”  And since Carlyle and others were critics 
of “the Enlightenment” it may be tempting to follow the practice initiated by Isaiah 
Berlin and see these figures as participating in a movement called “the Counter-
Enlightenment” (Mail and Wokler, 2003). But, while such a division might be useful for 
some purposes, it is less than helpful for any number of others.   
It can, first of all, promote a specious sense of common purpose to a group of 
thinkers who share rather little beyond the honor of having been selected, either by Berlin 
or by subsequent commentators, as part of “the Counter-Enlightenment.”  Historians of 
“the Enlightenment” have begun to doubt whether it is possible to speak of a single 
Enlightenment, unified around a single set of doctrines.  Those who invoke “the Counter-
Enlightenment” will likely find themselves forced down the same road, at which point 
they may find themselves wondering what, if anything, ties together a group of thinkers 
as diverse in their orientations and interests as Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Johann Gottfried 
Herder, Justus Möser, Joseph de Maistre, Friedrich Nietzsche, Martin Heidegger, and 
Max Horkheimer & Theodor Adorno. It can also lead, as J. G. A.  Pocock (1999) has 
argued, to an overly restricted view as to what sort of “enlightenment” was being 
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countered, with the category “Counter-Enlightenment” serving as an all-too convenient 
resting place for anything that doesn’t fit into the commentator’s sense of what “the 
Enlightenment” involved:  consider how recent literature has questioned whether Johann 
Gottfried Herder (Norton, 1991) and Justus Möser (Knudsen, 1986) – both classified by 
Berlin as part of the “Counter-Enlightenment” – might, in fact, have a great deal more in 
common with certain tendencies in Enlightenment thought than Berlin assumed. Finally, 
such a neat compartmentalization will make it difficult to see how the notion that there 
was such a thing as “the Enlightenment” arose in the first place:  when tracing the history 
of concepts, even though the absence of a word for something may not be evidence that 
the thing wasn’t there, it is an invitation to look more carefully at the way in which past 
thinkers grappled for concepts whose existence we now take for granted.  This last task 
will occupy me here.  In trying to understand what the Enlightenment was and what it 
still might be, it may help to look at some of the ways in which it was talked about during 
an age that was not entirely sure what it was all about.  
 
II.  Questioning the Ends of Enlightenment 
Thanks to the efforts of Ralph Waldo Emerson, Thomas Carlyle’s library wound 
up at Harvard, allowing those who are so inclined to paw through the books he used 
when writing the History of Frederick the Great.  One of the more peculiar items in the 
collection is Johann Georg von Zimmermann, Fragmente über Friedrich den Grossen zur 
Geschichte seines Lebens, seiner Regierung, und seines Charakters.  Dating from 1790, 
the book is (as advertised) a collection of anecdotes about Frederick, with little tying 
them together beyond their interest in illuminating various aspects of the monarch’s life 
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and reign as seen from the perspective of his physician. Late in the book, Zimmermann 
considers the political consequences of Frederick’s death, with special attention to the 
reactions of the “Berlin Aufklärungssynagoge.” Synagoge is employed here as a synonym 
for the French clique, which Zimmerman defined, in turn, through a reference to the 
Schattenriss von Berlin (a motley collection of sketches of Berlin life –some fairly risqué 
– dating from 1788), as designating “the union of various persons towards the 
advancement of their needs” (259-60).1  The Berlin that emerges from the Schattenriss is 
a city populated by Litterarcliquen that  “take pride in working toward the enlightenment 
of the people.”  In the wake of Frederick’s death, these groups sought “to enlighten” 
Friedrich Wilhelm II, the new monarch. Yet, Zimmerman warns, the prejudices that these 
groups harbor “are entirely contrary to enlightenment” (252-3). 
It is difficult to be entirely sure what Zimmermann is driving at and much of this 
difficulty stems from his failure to give us what we have come to expect.  We know that 
Friedrich Wilhelm II responded to what we have come to call “the Berlin Enlightenment” 
with edicts on religion and on censorship, edicts which in turn touched off a vigorous 
pamphlet war in which champions of Aufklärung gathered under the banner of freedom 
                                                
1  This construction parallels English usage from the same period where “synagogue” 
was employed, in controversial literature, as a term of abuse from gatherings devoted 
to the pursuit of ends which stand in opposition to those of the pious.  To cite a few 
examples from the Oxford English Dictionary.: Milton referred to the Scots 
Presbytery in Belfast as an “unchristian Synagogue” while, in 1674, Hickman 
expressed the wish that “no Arminians had … forsaken the Church of England, and 
took sanctuary in the Synagogue of Rome.” 
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of the press and championed a decidedly unorthodox interpretation of Christian beliefs 
that has come to be called “neology.”2 In this view of things, the ascent of Friedrich 
Wilhelm II to the throne signifies the beginning of a series of events that would mark “the 
end of the Enlightenment in Prussia” (Lestition 1993). Zimmermann, however, doesn’t 
see things this way.  While he is quite well-disposed towards Friedrich Wilhelm II, he 
also – like the author of the Schattenriss—presents himself as an advocate of 
“enlightenment,” though his enlightenment is not the same sort of enlightenment that is 
advocated by the members of the Berlin Aufklärungsynagoge.  “Germany’s true 
enlightenment,” he insists, “hangs on countless threads, it is the consequence of a 
multitude of causes, it does not have an exclusively Berlin origin, it is not at all a Berlin 
monopoly” (288). Where, he asks, is there a more enlightened land than England, and 
what do the members of the Berlin enlightenment clique really know about conditions in 
England?  Only in a madhouse, he continues, could it be argued that the fall of the 
Bastille (which he seems to applaud) was “the fruit of the Berlin Enlightenment” (289). 
He concludes that while there may be widespread affection for the word Aufklärung in 
Germany, the respect for the word is rarely accompanied by much attention to the actual 
thing (295). 
                                                
2  The classic study of this episode is Schwartz (1925).  For a brief discussion in 
English, see the translators’ introduction to Carl Friedrich Bahrdt, The Edict of 
Religion. A Comedy (2000). translated by John Christian Laursen and Johan van der 
Zande (Lantham, MD:  Lexington Books, 2000).  Bahrdt was one of the Edict’s most 
audacious and creative critics. 
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There is, Zimmermann suggests, much confusion about what may properly be 
called “enlightenment.”  The members of the Berlin Aufklärungssynagoge are speaking a 
different language than he – and, one would assume, his implied audience – speaks.  So 
he attempts to explain what they are saying by translating their terms back to the tongue 
from which they have been pilfered – which, he argues, is French.  The scheme that was 
hatched in the literary cliques 
is now called in Berlin Aufklärung (Illuminatisme); the members 
of the synagogue are called Aufklärer (Illuminants);  and 
Aufgeklärte (Illuminés) are the blind slaves of this sect.  Of the 
true enlightenment (progrès des lumières) nothing is spoken in the 
Berlin Aufklärungssynagogue (282). 
Zimmermann was not alone in his confusion as to what was meant when the ideal of 
Aufklärung was invoked.  Since 1784, when Johann Friedrich Zöllner – a clergyman, 
educator, freemason, and member of an exclusive secret society in Berlin called by its 
members the “Friends of Enlightenment” and known to the rest of the world (to the 
extent that it was known at all) as the “Wednesday Society” – inserted a footnote in an 
article of his in the Berlinische Monatsschrift asking for someone to answer the question 
“What is enlightenment?,”  the question of what enlightenment involved had been hotly 
debated (Schmidt 1996). The discussion began with a complaint:  Zöllner couldn’t (or at 
least feigned that he couldn’t) understand what those who contributed articles to the 
Berlinische Monatsschrift (contributors who, it should be noted, were members of the 
same secret society to which he belonged) meant when they spoke of Aufklärung.  It 
ended in utter confusion, with one journal publishing a review of the debate which 
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concluded that the word had been so divorced from any clear conventions of usage that it 
was unclear what exactly it might mean (Anonymous, 1790). 
Yet this much about the meaning of the word was clear:  to pose the question 
“What is enlightenment?” at the end of the eighteenth century was to request clarification 
regarding a process or an activity, rather than to ask for a definition of an historical 
period or an intellectual movement.  If this nuance is frequently overlooked today – 
where studies of what we call “the Enlightenment” routinely begin with an appeal to 
Kant’s 1784 response to Zöllner’s question – it was not lost on the man who first 
translated Kant’s response into English.  In his1798 translation, John Richardson 
rendered the title of Kant’s “Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung?” as “An 
Answer to the Question:  What is Enlightening?” thus capturing, better than any modern 
translator (including the author of this paper) that Kant took Aufklärung to designate 
something that one did, rather than an age in which one was living (Kant, 1798, 3). What 
exactly this process might involve and what its proper ends might be was something that 
was open for dispute, hence the massive outpouring of essays which attempted to 
distinguish “true enlightenment” from “false enlightenment” (Schneiders, 1974). But 
while the proper ends of this process might be in dispute, there was no suggestion in 
these essays that any of their authors thought they were attempting to characterize a 
particular historical period – a period with more or less clear temporal boundaries – 
known as “the Enlightenment.” The “enlightenment” with which eighteenth-century 
commentaries wrestled was an activity that was oriented towards a diverse set of ends, 
rather than a period that could be defined by a beginning and an end.  Setting up those 
temporal boundaries would be the task of the nineteenth century. 
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III. Ending the Enlightenment 
 Paul Leopold Haffner came to Mainz in 1864 as a thirty-five year old Catholic 
priest, having studied at Tübingen and having briefly taught philosophy.  He became 
bishop of the city in 1886 and held the post until his death in 1899.  His importance for 
our discussion resides in a small book that he published in same year that he took up his 
post in Mainz:  Die deutsche Aufklärung.  Eine historische Skizze.  Haffner found little to 
like about the Enlightenment and – like his other major publication, a history of 
materialism – the purpose of the book was to recount the history of a movement that good 
Catholics should find appalling.  There is little in Haffner’s study that cannot be found in 
later accounts, but that is what makes it significant.  Here, in the middle of the nineteenth 
century, we have a book that lays out a history of the Enlightenment that is not all that 
different in its contents from some of the sketches that we can find in present-day 
textbooks.  Where eighty years earlier Germans were confused as to what Aufklärung 
designated, Haffner so confident that he understands what the Enlightenment was all 
about that he attempts an historical sketch of its German wing. 
He treats his readers, however, to a moment of hesitation at the very start of the 
book, professing confusion as to his topic:  will he be recounting a history of “German 
enlightenment” or of “German endarkenment [Verfinsternung]”?  Faced with such a 
quandary he suggests that it might be advisable to follow the advice of Pius IX, who 
argued that when attempting to understand the meaning of a word, one should go back to 
its origin.  And following the advice of the Holy Father, Haffner discovers that 
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Enlightenment is a sublime word, if one goes back to its meaning;  
it means illumination of the spirit through truth,  liberation from 
the shadows of error, or uncertainty, of doubt.  Enlightenment is, in 
its deepest meaning, the transfiguration (Verklärung) of reason 
(Haffner, 1864,1). 
To write a history of this enlightenment, one would have to “begin with God and end 
with God.”   
This, however, is not the history that Haffner will offer.  He is, he confesses, “too 
much a child of the nineteenth century” to depart so violently from its conventions of 
speech.  Instead, he proposes to speak the language of his own day, “which exchanges the 
meaning of light and darkness” and produces a literature which regards “the light of 
Christian centuries as dark gloom” and which “greets the shadows of doubt and the 
progress of religious barbarity as light” (Haffner, 1864, 4). The enlightenment whose 
history he will recount rests on a rejection of 
1) all truths, which have their origin in divine supernatural 
revelation; … 2) authority and belief in authority as a principle of 
knowledge; and … 3) all sources of knowledge that lie above the 
level of the human mind (Haffner, 1864, 4). 
This enlightenment, then, is “purely negative, destructive, empty; it has no positive 
content and no productive principle.”  In order to be counted among the truly enlightened, 
one must “know nothing” (Haffner, 1864, 4). 
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While Haffner cannot match Carlyle in the inventiveness of the language in which 
he frames his indictment, the two share the conviction that whatever it was that so 
unsettled the eighteenth century has now run its course.  Haffner argues that the 
Enlightenment was laid to rest by “Schiller and Goethe, Schelling and Hegel” and by the 
arrrival of the romantic school, in whose work he sensed a foreshadowing of a rising 
“Catholic consciousness” which promises to replace the “cold light” of the enlightenment 
with the “warm” light of life (Haffner, 1864, 9, 141-3). Thus, his initial uncertainty as to 
whether he is narrating a tale of enlightenment or endarkenment is little more than a 
rhetorical ploy.  He lives in an age which has learned to use die Aufklärung as a way of 
designating a particular historical period, a period populated by a particular cast of 
characters, most of whom will be mentioned in the course of his survey.  He also lives in 
an age that has settled on a group of adjectives that can be attached to this noun:  for 
instance, “cold,” “narrow,” “empty.” In knowing which adjectives to choose when 
talking about the Enlightenment he was also a child of his age.   
How did his age get to be the way it was and to talk the way it did? The decisive 
influence seems to be G. W. F. Hegel, who was one of the first, if not the first, to employ 
the term Aufklärung as a name for a particular historical period.  In the Phenomenology of 
Spirit (1806) he still used the term as a way of designating a process describes a process 
— the spread of “pure insight” — rather than a particular historical period (Hegel, 1970, 
III:400). As Robert Pippin has rightly observed, in the Phenomenology the term refers to 
“a human activity, not a happening but a doing” (Pippin, 1997, 7). However, in his Berlin 
lectures from the 1820s, he began to use the word differently.  At the close of the lectures 
on the philosophy of history, he reflected on an event whose impact he himself had 
experienced: the French Revolution.  Explaining to his students what the world was like 
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when he was their age, he spoke of the enthusiasm that had gripped his contemporaries 
when they learned that “the old framework of injustice” had toppled overnight, unable to 
resist the onslaught of a new and triumphant ideal: the notion that constitutions should be 
established on the basis of reason (Hegel, 1970, XII:529). The celebration, however, 
proved premature. The Revolution collapsed into the Terror, the Terror gave way to the 
Directory, the Directory crumbled before Napoleon, war engulfed Europe, and  — when 
the “fifteen years’ farce” was finally played out — the monarchy was restored. There 
were some, he noted, who charged that “the French Revolution resulted from 
philosophy.” It was an accusation he was not inclined to dismiss, though he stressed that 
the philosophy which provided the “first impetus” for the Revolution was not “the 
concrete comprehension of absolute truth” that, presumably, he was offering his students, 
but rather that “abstract thought” for which the French had a particular weakness.  This 
superficial approach to philosophy, which summoned all established authorities to the 
tribunal of reason and attempted to deduce both the laws of nature and “the substance of 
what is right and good” from individual consciousness, was known by the “infamous 
name” Aufklärung.3    
                                                
3  The phrase translated as “infamous name” appears in appears in Friedrich Stieve’s 
lecture note from the winter semester of 1826-1827 as “verruchten Namen” (Hegel 
[1968] 915, footnote). Lasson suggests that the term may have been the result of a 
mishearing and that Hegel presumably had said “verrufenen Namen.” The English 
word “infamous” encompasses both German terms.  The German verrufen refers to 
the reputation enjoyed by a thing, rather than the thing itself, i.e. infamous in the 
sense of “held in infamy, while " the German verrucht  — “monstrous” or 
“abominable” —refers to the thing itself, rather than its reputation, i.e. infamous in 
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Similar uses of the word can be found in his other lecture cycles from the Berlin 
period.  In his 1825-26 lectures on the history of philosophy he used Aufklärung to 
designate the “German form” of the broad movement in eighteenth-century that sought to 
turn “natural feelings and sound human understanding” into a principle that could be used 
to scrutinize religion and ethical life (Hegel, 1990, III:206-7). In other texts from the 
same period, the word was extended to encompass eighteenth century French and English 
thought as well (Hegel, 1970, 431). The same pattern can be found in the Berlin lectures 
on the philosophy of religion, where Aufklärung denotes the movement of thought that 
turned against the doctrinal system of the churches in the name of “rational theology” 
(Hegel, 1984, 122-125). It rejected the doctrine of the Trinity as incoherent, thus 
embracing an abstract and shallow approach to religion that, in the end, deprived the 
notion of God of all content (Hegel, 1985, 244). A mode of thought that “knows only of 
negation, of limit, of determinacy as such” it “does an absolute injustice to content” and 
represents “the ultimate pinnacle of the formal culture of our time” (Hegel, 1985, 344-6). 
Thus, in his Berlin lectures, Hegel used Aufklärung as a way of designating an 
historical epoch that was now completed.  We are separated from it by the French 
Revolution, which both marks the end of the period and proves to be the end towards 
which Aufklärung had been moving (whether it knew it or not) all along.  The same event 
                                                                                                                                            
the sense of "deserving of infamy.” Lasson assumed that Hegel employed the weaker 
of these two terms, while Stieve thought he was hearing the former. In any case, the 
use of either phrase is further complicated by its use in conjunction with “name” — 
i.e., is it the “name” which is infamous or monstrous or the event to which the name 
refers? 
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which terminates the Aufklärung also, allegedly, reveals its true character:  it was 
abstract, cold, and narrow, it had no respect for faith or tradition, it was French, and when 
put into practice it was the cause of public mayhem of a sort that was historically 
unprecedented.  Not the least of Hegel’s achievements was to have framed a way of 
talking about the Enlightenment that would have a career long after his own particular 
version of the story had been dismissed or forgotten. 
 
IV.  The Enlightenment Becomes History 
To see what historians would subsequently do with Hegel’s account we need only 
look at the work of one of his former Berlin students, the historian Max Duncker. His 
1845 lecture on the “crisis of the Renaissance” opened with a summary of recent German 
intellectual history that saw it as moving through four periods, the first of which was 
designated as die Aufklärung. Duckner, like Hegel before him, held that the impact of 
Aufklärung was primarily negative.  It destroyed, but it could not create: “the enlightened 
gaze of the understanding … was unable to comprehend and conceptualize the product of 
drives, of fantasy, of feeling” (Southard, 1994, 72-5). In Duckner’s account, it fell to the 
Romantic period to find a way to overcome these failings, just as it fell to the period of 
“philosophical rationalism” (a period that Duckner associated with German idealism in 
general and Hegel in particular) to remedy the failings of Romanticism. It remained for 
the present — designated by Duckner as a period of “historical rationalism” — to correct 
the shortcomings of German idealism. 
The temporal boundaries of the historical period that came to be designated as die 
Aufklärung remained somewhat unclear. Historians of philosophy such as Schwegler 
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tended to follow Hegel’s lead and trace the origins of the Aufklärung to Descartes and to 
see Kant’s work as signaling its conclusion.   Literary historians typically used the term 
to denote a period that began in the late seventeenth century and ended either with the 
revolt of the Sturm und Drang shortly after the middle of the eighteenth century or with 
the rise of the so-called “Classical Period” represented by Goethe and Schiller.4 One 
consequence of carving up history in this way was that it tended to remove figures such 
as Kant or Schiller from the ranks of Aufklärer, making it all the easier to present the 
Aufklärung as an impoverished period, largely derivative of French models, which — at 
least in Germany — was quickly overcome.  This, indeed, was one of Haffner’s chief 
points: the “German Enlightenment” was not, in fact, German at all – it was a French 
import (Haffner, 1864, 8). 
English usage was largely dependent on this German literature, but tended to lag 
behind it, as can be seen by the difficulties that English translators of the works of Hegel 
and of German historians of philosophy had in coming up with an English equivalent for 
Aufklärung. The convention of translating die Aufklärung as the Enlightenment  was not 
                                                
4  Book Three of Hermann Hettner (1894), which deals with the “Classical Age of 
German Literature,” begins with an introduction entitled, “The Battle Against the 
Limits of the Enlightenment” and then goes on to a discussion of the Sturm und 
Drang. Heinrich Julian Schmidt (1886) has a chapter on “Enlightenment and Pietism 
1687-1699” which examines Pufendorf and Thomasius, among others. It is followed 
by sections devoted to “Die Kopfzeit 1720-1748” and to “The Rise of Idealism 
1748-1763.” For a brief discussion of the question of periodization in nineteenth 
century literary historians, see Batts, 1993, 84-5. 
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established until close to the end of the century.  Until that time, translators experimented 
with terms like “the Lighting Up” or “the Illumination,” employed the French 
Éclaircissement, or simply left the German term untranslated (Schmidt, 2003). Even 
when, early in the next century, the Princeton philosopher John Grier Hibben published 
The Philosophy of the Enlightenment (1910) – the first book in English to carry the term 
in its title – he seems to have been unsure whether his readers would be familiar with 
what it was that his book was discussing.  The opening of the book gives the impression 
of a man attempting to cover all the possible bases:  within the space of two pages 
Hibben refers to the period as “the Enlightenment, or Aufklärung,” as the “philosophical 
century,” as “the age of illumination, or enlightenment,” and, finally, that old standby:  
“the age of reason” (3-4).  
For Hibben, the Enlightenment was “an age characterized by a restless spirit of 
inquiry” and animated by a spirit of “searching investigation and criticism” (3). He 
argued that it was a period of interest to his readers not only because of its own merits but 
also for its “representative value” but also because it illustrated the path traversed by 
“great thought movements in general” (7-8). In good Hegelian fashion Hibben argued 
that movements of thought typically begin with the expression of an idea that is 
“necessarily partial, one-sided, or extreme” and then move on to a stage where the idea is 
“subjected to a running fire of criticism,” a stage in which contradictions and 
inconsistencies are brought to light. When these controversies have run their course, the 
stage is set for “a period of reconstruction” in which “contradictions are resolved, 
limitations are removed, whatever may have been inadequate is completed” by supplying 
insights that were lacking in the original statement of the idea (8). Thus, in Hibben’s 
presentation, the Enlightenment begins with Locke’s Essay Concerning Understanding, a 
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work that inspired such divergent philosophies as Berkeley’s idealism, the rationalism of 
Wolff and Leibniz, and the materialism of Priestley, Diderot, Helvetius, and Holbach. Its 
shortcomings were subsequently elaborated by Hume, and Hume’s criticism prepared the 
way for Kant’s efforts at reconstruction. While the overarching Hegelian structure of his 
account sometimes seems forced, Hibben’s scholarship demonstrates a wide reading in 
the area of eighteenth-century philosophy: a year of study in Berlin acquainted him with 
the work of Lessing, Mendelssohn, and Herder and he had an appreciation for the 
arguments of Diderot and Rousseau.  His discussions are well-informed and devoid of the 
animosity that had marked so many nineteenth-century accounts of eighteenth-century 
philosophy. Indeed, to read Hibben is to be reminded of a much more famous work, a 
work that would eventually be translated into English with the same title as Hibben’s 
then-forgotten book: Ernst Cassirer’s Die Philosophie der Aufklärung.5 
Like Hibben, Cassirer saw individual thinkers as part of a larger story involving 
the development of Western thought.  In an oft-quoted passage he described the aims of 
the book as an attempt to present the Enlightenment in its “characteristic depth” rather 
than “breadth,” to elucidate its “conceptual origin” and its “underlying principles” rather 
than to record “the totality of its historical manifestations and results” (v). Cassirer’s 
concern with seeing the work of individual thinkers the context of the broader 
development of modern philosophy would draw a sharp critique from Peter Gay in his 
well-known critique of his teacher’s work (Gay, 1967). Gay’s attempt to write a “social 
                                                
5  Hibben’s study was listed in the bibliography of Cassirer’s 1931 article on 
“Enlightenment” in the Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, but Cassirer makes no 
reference to Hibben’s work in his own book, which did not contain a bibliography.  
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history of ideas” would, in turn, be criticized by Robert Darnton, who suggested that Gay 
had not been entirely successful in breaking free from the sort of history of ideas that 
Cassirer had been writing (Darnton, 1971). But even earlier, doubts about the coherence 
of Cassirer’s account of the Enlightenment were being raised by scholars who found it 
difficult to see how the particular aspects of the Enlightenment they had been exploring 
were supposed to fit into the narrative that Cassirer had constructed (Dieckmann, 1961; 
Niklaus, 1967; Crocker, 1987). 
In retrospect, it is not difficult to see why such doubts were bound to surface.   In 
Hegel’s Berlin lectures, Aufklärung designated an historical period – embodied by a 
particular set of philosophers – that played a specific role in the overall architectonic of 
his philosophical system.  In the decades after Hegel’s death, confidence in the coherence 
or the utility of his system faded, but the rough outlines he had set for the Enlightenment 
continued to serve as a way of structuring historical narratives.   The particular thinkers 
who made up his Enlightenment continued to figure in these accounts, but over time were 
joined by other figures.  For a while it was possible – witness the work of Hibben and 
Cassirer – to provide some sort of philosophical coherence to accounts of this sort, even 
without the resources of the Hegelian system, and, over time, other ways of patching 
together a story about the Enlightenment would be attempted (e.g., Paul Hazard’s attempt 
to see the Enlightenment as the crucial moment in a “crisis of European consciousness”). 
But as a focus on the social history of ideas came to replace the grand, overarching 
narrative that had been the stock in trade of Hegelian accounts, the alleged unity of the 
Enlightenment tended to look more and more doubtful.  By the last decades of the 
twentieth century what might be described a “pluralization of the Enlightenment” was 
well underway.  Scholars had gotten used to speaking of various national enlightenments 
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– Scottish, German, Italian, and, eventually, English (Porter & Teich, 1981) – and then, 
within some of these national enlightenments, they began to discover “rival 
enlightenments” struggling with one another (Hunter, 2001). Even those who criticized 
this tendency and sought to describe an enlightenment that transcended national borders 
only wound up introducing another division into the already fractured landscape:  the 
distinction between a cosmopolitan “radical” enlightenment and the various, more 
conservative, national enlightenments (Israel, 2001). Social historians were accustomed 
to looking beneath the “high” enlightenment of famous thinkers and their texts in order to 
map the “low enlightenment” of the clandestine book market.  Still others focused on the 
network of institutions – scientific academies, secret societies, coffee-houses, and salons 
– that served as the arena in which the various ideas and projects associated with the 
Enlightenment (as well as a variety of ideas and projects that only now came to be 
associated with the Enlightenment) circulated.  It is, then, hardly surprising that in the 
face of this pluralization of enlightenments, some have suggested – perhaps none more 
insistently than J. G. A.  Pocock– that it might be better to dispense with the definite 
article and eschew claims about “the Enlightenment” in favor of a more careful account 
of the languages spoken by the various enlightenments that inhabited eighteenth-century 
Europe (Pocock, 1998, 7). 
 
V.  Enlightenment After “the Enlightenment” 
This proliferation of enlightenments is not an entirely unfortunate development.  
Indeed, with apologies to Carlyle, we might regard it as profitable, probably inevitable, 
and less an occasion for pity than for gratitude.  That it was probably inevitable should be 
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clear from the arguments of the preceding section:  absent an overarching philosophical 
structure of the sort Hegel had once provided, it is difficult to see how the various 
individuals, institutions, and project which we have come to associate with the 
Enlightenment can be seen as part of a single story.  The demise of such accounts has 
been profitable in at least two ways.  First, it has allowed scholars working in the area of 
eighteenth-century studies to pursue research into thinkers, institutions, and projects that 
did not figure prominently in the sorts of overarching accounts of “the Enlightenment” 
that one finds in Hibben, Cassirer, and even in Gay.  Second, it has also provided a way 
of responding to those critics of “the Enlightenment Project” whose recycle a series of 
rhetorical tropes that can be traced back to the nineteenth century:  “the Enlightenment” 
these critics attack is largely a creature of their own (or, more likely, Hegel’s) making 
and might best be regarded as the latest form taken by a literature whose scholarly 
credentials have long passed their expiration date.6 
Some scholars, however, have questioned whether its pluralization entails too 
great a cost.  John Robertson has recently sought to “make a case for the Enlightenment 
in the singular” by restoring “a definite intellectual content” to the Enlightenment and 
then examining the ways in which this content was articulated in differing social contexts 
(Robertson, 2003). He argues that this “intellectual content” must be more sensitive to the 
actual concerns of the historical Enlightenment than either the somewhat simplified 
version of the Enlightenment that Isaiah Berlin used as the foil for his Counter-
                                                
6  For examples of such responses see the essays collected in Baker & Reill (2001) and 
Gordon (2001).  Daniel Gordon, editor., 2001).  I have discussed this literature in 
Schmidt, 2000 and Schmidt, 2002.  
  Schmidt 22 
Enlightenment or the overly philosophical conception employed by Ernst Cassirer (73-
5).7  On the other hand, against those who would reduce the Enlightenment to its social 
or institutional settings, Robertson insists, 
If ideas are no longer the focus of attention, it is much harder to 
define and to defend the Enlightenment’s distinctive identity.  It 
was as a movement of ideas that the Enlightenment acquired its 
historical significance, for good and ill; to marginalize its 
intellectual content, as social and cultural historians tend to do, is 
to make “Enlightenment” into a label of convenience, with little or 
no substantive significance (77-78). 
Robertson proposes that the “intellectual content” of the Enlightenment is to be found in 
its “commitment to understanding, and hence to advancing, the causes and conditions of 
human betterment in this world.”  Emphasizing that the “first part of this formula is as 
important as the second,” Robertson sees three concerns as central to the Enlightenment’s 
efforts to understand the causes and conditions of human betterment:  1) the systematic 
study of human nature, 2) inquiries into the causes of “material betterment, the subject 
matter of political economy,” and 3) more general investigations, beyond the more 
specific concerns of political economy, with the historical progress of society “from 
‘barbarism’ to ‘refinement’ or ‘civilization’” (78). In demonstrating the ways in which 
                                                
7  Robertson’s claim, however, that Cassirer saw Kant’s philosophy as providing “a 
systematic summation of the intellectual project of the entire Enlightenment” tends 
to overstate the role of Kant in Cassirer’s account.  For a corrective, see Wright 
(2001, 91-3). 
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this particular set of ideas was put into practice, Robertson proposes a comparative study 
of the activity of enlightenment that focuses on “its development in two of its most 
distant settings: Scotland and Naples.”  By focusing on two “national contexts” that 
differed markedly in geography, history, and intellectual resources, Robertson hopes to 
show how – in spite of these differences – “a common engagement with the 
Enlightenment” can be seen (82). 
Robertson grants that the Enlightenment he proposes to investigate “does not 
include everything which many recent scholars have wished to associate with it” and that 
a focus on the Enlightenment, understood in this way, will make it necessary “to set aside 
much that recent scholarship has suggested is of great interest” (though he is quick to add 
that this does not mean that “what is set aside should not be studied in its own right”).  
This more restricted focus, he argues, yields considerable benefits: 
… the unrestricted definition Enlightenment, or its alternative, the 
admission that there were multiple Enlightenments, has rendered 
the subject so blurred and indeterminate that it is impossible to 
reach any assessment of its historical significance.  The 
Enlightenment for which I have made a case here is one, I suggest, 
which existed as an historical phenomena, rather than an artificial 
philosophical construct.  It is not an Enlightenment which can be 
held directly responsible for the horrors, any more than for the 
advances, of the twentieth century; far too much history lies in 
between.  But as a specific intellectual movement of the eighteenth 
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century, it is an Enlightenment which can be matched against the 
conditions which faced it in its own time (82). 
While there is much in this proposal that is sensible and promising, it may be worth 
asking whether Robertson’s distinction between the Enlightenment as “historical 
phenomenon” and as “philosophical construct” holds up. 
If the history of attempts to respond to the question “What is enlightenment?” that 
has been traced in this paper is accurate, it would appear that where Robertson sees “an 
historical phenomenon,” others might well see an historian’s construct.  This construct is, 
in many respects, preferable to the various philosophical constructs that Robertson 
(rightly) questions, but it is, for better or worse, a construct – a way of bringing 
coherence to a decidedly messy historical reality by highlighting certain features of that 
reality and downplaying others.  Robertson’s construct has the advantage of capturing an 
aspect of efforts at enlightenment that is of central importance:  the conviction that 
enlightenment was a process, an activity, something that one did.  He has focused 
attention on some central components of this activity: the framing of sciences of human 
nature, political economy, and historical development.  But he does this at the cost of 
neglecting certain other activities that other historians have seen as important parts of the 
process of enlightenment.  For instance, would the concern with the cultivation of a new 
understanding of what was involved in “civility,” a concern that Daniel Gordon (1994) 
has explored in his work on the French Enlightenment, be included in those activities 
which Robertson sees as part of “the Enlightenment” or is Gordon’s work concerned with 
one of those (otherwise worthy) areas of inquiry that fall outside the conception of 
Enlightenment that Robertson seeks to articulate? Or what about those Spinozists, 
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materialists, and pantheists who made up Jonathan Israel’s cosmopolitan “radical 
enlightenment” (Israel, 2001)?  Robertson would seem to want to exclude them from his 
account of the Enlightenment understood as a “historical phenomenon” because 
“Spinoza’s materialism did not exhaust the philosophical resources available to 
Enlightenment thinkers” (79) and because those who focused on the bettering of this 
world did not, necessarily, have to deny the possibility of future redemption in another 
world. Yet, Israel has presented us with a group of thinkers who labored under the 
impression that the improvement of this world involved, in part, efforts at unmasking the 
ways in which hopes of a better world had been exploited by priests and kings for their 
own benefit. The fact that Spinozism was not the only resource available to 
Enlightenment thinkers does nothing to alter the fact that Israel has discovered a group of 
Spinozists who saw themselves as engaged in what they took to be enlightenment.  
If the study of eighteenth century texts teaches us anything it is that the answer to 
the question of what enlightenment involved was not entirely obvious to those who 
thought they were doing it– which was, after all, the reason why Pastor Zöllner asked his 
question in the first place.  To be sure, nothing obliges historians to remain as confused 
about such questions as those who were asking them.  But it would seem that at least part 
of the task of making sense of the Enlightenment “as an historical phenomenon” would 
be to avoid – in the effort to make things neater – throwing out too many of the 
conflicting images of enlightenment that populated the eighteenth century.  Those 
conflicting images offer us our best contemporary record of what was involved in the 
“historical phenomenon” that we call “the Enlightenment.” All the rest is construct and 
commentary. 
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Kant was well aware of this.  Thirty years ago Franco Venturi (1971, 1-17) 
suggested that the understanding of the European Enlightenment “from Kant to Cassirer 
and beyond” had been dominated by a “philosophical interpretation of the German 
Aufklärung which had led historians to overlook the political dimensions of the 
Enlightenment. He may have been right about the part of this history that runs from 
Hegel to Cassirer and beyond, but he was less than fair to Kant.  Kant’s account of what 
enlightenment involved was, after all, rather catholic:  he defined it, quite simply, as the 
free use of public reason.  Aside from the requirement of publicity, he had rather little to 
say about what counted as a contribution to enlightenment.  This would, presumably, be 
something that would also have to be decided in the tribunal of public deliberation.  
Kant’s response to Zöllner’s question may be too diffuse to serve as a definition of “the 
Enlightenment” – though the not inconsiderable body of work that has grown out of 
Jürgen Habermas’ attempt to see what Kant’s understanding of enlightenment might 
mean in terms of the development of the “bourgeois public sphere” suggests that it has 
not been without significance (Habermas, 1962). But, as an attempt to capture something 
of what enlightenment might have meant to those who were engaged in it, it acquits itself 
rather well.   
What, in the end, does it mean to “make a case for the Enlightenment”?  As an 
historical construct, as a way of grouping historical materials into a coherent narrative,  
“the Enlightenment” will prove its utility by the sort of research it provokes, research 
which – if the past history of the notion – is any indication, will force us to keep testing 
our generalizations about the Enlightenment against the staggering variety of evidence 
that the eighteenth century provides as to what might (or might not) count as part of this 
Enlightenment.  Those who are attempting to “make a case for the Enlightenment” may 
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have something to gain by trying to deal with the objections of those who, like Pocock, 
have been filing briefs against “the Enlightenment” and advocating the multiplying of 
enlightenments.  Likewise, those who have found Pocock’s tack promising can be 
grateful to scholars like Robertson for providing an alternative to the accounts of “the 
Enlightenment” that populated the earlier literature.   
Making the case for enlightenment, however, involves something different from 
defending “the Enlightenment.” Critics of “the Enlightenment Project” typically ignore 
this distinction and then proceed to level attacks on something that diverges marked from 
what historians typically understand as “the Enlightenment.”  At their best, these 
criticisms raised questions about what ought to count as rational, what sorts of activities 
should be considered reasonable, what sorts of rights (if any) individuals ought to enjoy, 
what role (if any) religious beliefs should play in civil society, and so on.  While the 
questions that critics of “the Enlightenment” are raising may be worth considering, the 
historical claims that accompany these questions lag well behind current scholarship on 
the Enlightenment.  It might be worth pointing this out.  In clarifying how we think about 
the issues such critics raise, it might also be helpful to read some works by thinkers who 
have been the part of one or another of the enlightenments that historians have explored.  
This is all the more necessary since critics of “the Enlightenment Project” do not always 
seem to have spent much time with eighteenth-century texts. But, in the end, when we 
enter into discussions – whether as historians, as political theorists, or as citizens – of the 
questions that critics of the Enlightenment are trying to raise, it might be helpful to 
realize that we are neither making a case for nor against the Enlightenment.  What we are, 
instead, engaging in efforts at enlightenment – an activity that, pace Carlyle, is by no 
means finished. 
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